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1. Incompatibilism	  and	  Libertarianism	  
	  
Incompatibilism	  is	  the	  doctrine	  according	  to	  which	  the	  truth	  of	  
determinism	  entails	  that	  there	  is	  no	  free	  will.	  One	  of	  its	  versions	  -­‐	  	  
libertarianism	  -­‐	  claims	  that	  there	  is	  free	  will.	  Libertarians	  thus	  conclude,	  
by	  Modus	  Tollens,	  that	  determinism	  must	  be	  false.	  	  
	  
Typically,	  the	  incompatibilist	  premise	  of	  the	  libertarian	  argument	  is	  
argued	  for	  by	  means	  of	  philosophical	  reasoning.	  Usually,	  this	  reasoning	  
proceeds	  along	  the	  steps	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Consequence	  Argument.	  These	  
are	  the	  following.	  First,	  the	  statement	  that	  the	  truth	  of	  determinism	  
entails	  that	  our	  actions	  are	  a	  consequence	  of	  both	  events	  that	  occurred	  
long	  before	  we	  were	  born	  and	  the	  laws	  of	  nature.	  Second,	  the	  statement	  
that	  both	  what	  happened	  before	  we	  were	  born	  and	  the	  laws	  of	  nature	  are	  
entirely	  beyond	  our	  control.	  Third,	  the	  statement	  that	  whatever	  is	  a	  
consequence	  of	  these	  past	  occurrences	  and	  the	  laws	  of	  nature	  must	  also	  
happen	  entirely	  beyond	  our	  control.	  Fourth,	  the	  statement	  that	  whatever	  
else	  our	  having	  free	  will	  might	  mean	  it	  certainly	  must	  mean	  that	  we	  do	  
have	  control	  over	  our	  actions.	  Finally,	  the	  conclusion	  that,	  if	  determinism	  
is	  true,	  then	  we	  have	  no	  free	  will.	  	  
	  
Regardless	  of	  the	  question	  of	  how	  convincing	  this	  chain	  deduction	  really	  
is	  (Dennett,	  for	  instance,	  produced	  an	  interesting	  evolutionary	  counter-­‐
argument	  against	  it),	  it	  is	  meant	  to	  justify	  only	  the	  major	  premise	  of	  the	  
libertarian	  argument.	  Obviously,	  determinist	  hardliners	  accept	  it	  too.	  
Contrary	  to	  libertarians	  though,	  they	  affirm	  that	  determinism	  is	  indeed	  
true.	  This	  they	  typically	  justify	  by	  appealing	  to	  what	  they	  take	  to	  be	  the	  
current	  scientific	  world	  view,	  deemed	  to	  be	  generally	  accepted	  
everywhere	  outside	  of	  quantum	  mechanics.	  Therefore	  –	  they	  conclude	  by	  
Modus	  Ponens	  –	  we	  have	  no	  free	  will.	  	  
	  
What	  confers	  its	  distinctive	  character	  to	  the	  libertarian	  position	  within	  
incompatibilism	  is	  thus	  the	  minor	  premise	  of	  the	  Modus	  Tollens	  argument	  
by	  means	  of	  which	  it	  is	  arrived	  at.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  this	  premise	  
states	  that	  there	  is	  free	  will	  (because	  we	  have	  it).	  But	  how	  do	  libertarians	  
know	  this	  to	  be	  the	  case?	  	  
	  
The	  free	  will	  libertarians	  claim	  we	  do	  have	  is	  of	  a	  peculiar	  sort.	  This	  
makes	  the	  question	  above	  all	  the	  more	  relevant.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	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libertarian	  free	  will	  is	  conceived	  of	  as	  satisfying	  a	  particularly	  strong	  
reading	  of	  two	  of	  the	  defining	  principles	  of	  this	  concept.	  These	  are	  the	  
principle	  of	  alternative	  possibilities	  (PAP)	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  ultimate	  
responsability	  (PUR).	  The	  former	  states	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  enjoy	  of	  free	  will,	  
the	  agent	  must	  have	  beforehand	  a	  genuine	  possibility	  of	  choosing	  from	  
among	  different	  available	  courses	  of	  action;	  and	  the	  latter	  states	  that,	  in	  
order	  to	  enjoy	  of	  free	  will,	  the	  agent	  must	  bear	  ultimate	  responsibility	  for	  
the	  action	  he	  ends	  up	  performing.	  According	  to	  the	  libertarian	  reading	  of	  
these	  italicized	  terms,	  in	  order	  to	  satisfy	  any	  of	  these	  principles	  the	  free	  
agent	  must	  be	  a	  sort	  of	  Aristotelian	  unmoved	  prime	  mover	  with	  respect	  
to	  his	  actions.	  Now,	  I,	  and	  presumably	  lots	  of	  other	  people,	  we	  certainly	  
need	  to	  be	  persuaded	  that	  something	  of	  this	  sort	  might	  be	  true	  of	  us.	  
	  
	  
2.	  Justifying	  the	  Minor	  Premise	  	  
	  
Surprisingly,	  there	  is	  little	  agreement	  on	  how	  to	  answer	  the	  question	  
above	  within	  libertarian	  literature	  itself.	  Some	  libertarian	  philosophers	  
(such	  as,	  e.g.,	  K.	  Lehrer)	  claim	  nothing	  else	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  support	  
the	  minor	  premise	  of	  the	  libertarian	  argument	  besides	  our	  having	  a	  very	  
powerful	  intuition	  that	  it	  is	  indeed	  true.	  But	  is	  it	  appropriate	  to	  claim	  that	  
it	  is	  true	  that	  we	  are	  free-­‐willed	  because	  we	  (or	  some	  of	  us)	  have	  the	  
intuition	  that	  we	  are?	  I	  take	  this	  view	  to	  be	  highly	  implausible.	  Others	  
seem	  to	  think	  the	  same.	  Within	  the	  libertarian	  camp,	  a	  major	  philosopher	  
holding	  an	  anti-­‐intuitionist	  view	  is	  van	  Inwagen.	  Indeed,	  he	  explicitly	  
claims	  that	  a	  justification	  of	  the	  minor	  premise	  of	  the	  libertarian	  
argument	  simply	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  appeal	  to	  the	  intuition	  that	  it	  is	  true	  
cannot	  be	  accepted.	  However,	  he	  purports	  both	  to	  sustain	  this	  claim	  and	  
to	  defend	  his	  own	  libertarian	  alternative	  to	  it	  by	  means	  of	  a	  combination	  
of	  philosophical	  arguments	  I	  find	  rather	  awkward.	  Let	  me	  try	  to	  show	  you	  
why.	  	  
	  
First,	  let	  us	  consider	  what	  we	  might	  call	  his	  anti-­intuitionist	  argument.	  
The	  first	  step	  of	  this	  argument	  consists	  of	  	  a	  thought-­‐experiment.	  This	  is	  
the	  following.	  Imagine	  that,	  when	  any	  human	  being	  is	  born,	  a	  device	  is	  
remotely	  implanted	  in	  his	  brain	  by	  some	  clever	  race	  of	  extraterrestrians;	  
and	  imagine	  further	  that	  this	  device	  is	  such	  that,	  whenever	  any	  human	  
must	  make	  a	  decision,	  it	  causes	  him	  to	  have	  the	  set	  of	  beliefs,	  desires	  and	  
intentions	  that	  will	  lead	  him	  to	  decide	  one	  way	  or	  another	  in	  agreement	  
with	  the	  prescriptions	  of	  a	  decision-­‐making	  program	  created	  by	  the	  
extraterrestrians;	  moreover,	  this	  device	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  such	  that	  it	  is	  
not	  detectable	  by	  any	  of	  the	  brainscan	  techniques	  we	  currently	  possess.	  
Under	  such	  imaginary	  circumstances,	  van	  Inwagen	  claims,	  humans	  would	  
obviously	  not	  enjoy	  of	  free	  will;	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  they	  would	  be	  nothing	  
but	  remote	  controlled	  puppets.	  
	  
Van	  Inwagen	  wants	  us	  then	  to	  consider	  the	  matters	  this	  thought-­‐
experiment	  describes	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  our	  experience.	  Once	  we	  do	  
that,	  we	  are	  presented	  with	  the	  following	  argument.	  First,	  we	  should	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recognize	  that,	  viewing	  things	  from	  this	  perspective,	  the	  possible	  world	  
envisaged	  in	  this	  thought-­‐experiment	  is	  indistinguishable	  from	  the	  world	  
we	  think	  we	  live	  in.	  Secondly,	  having	  recognized	  this,	  we	  are	  led	  to	  agree	  
that,	  in	  that	  possible	  world,	  we	  would	  certainly	  have	  the	  same	  intuitions	  
we	  do	  have	  in	  the	  supposedly	  actual	  world;	  one	  of	  these	  is,	  of	  course,	  the	  
intuition	  that	  we	  are	  free-­‐willed;	  thus,	  we	  would	  have	  it	  there	  too.	  Thirdly,	  
irrespective	  of	  how	  powerful	  this	  intuition	  might	  be	  in	  this	  possible	  
world,	  we	  have	  to	  concede	  that	  it	  would	  there	  be	  false.	  The	  fourth	  step	  of	  
the	  argument	  is	  then	  the	  claim	  that	  it	  follows	  from	  what	  was	  already	  
acknowledged	  in	  the	  first	  step	  that	  we	  cannot	  prove	  that	  the	  world	  we	  
live	  in	  is	  not	  in	  reality	  the	  possible	  world	  imagined	  in	  this	  thought-­‐
experiment.	  Finally,	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  argument	  states	  that	  we	  cannot	  
infer	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  proposition	  that	  we	  are	  free-­‐willed	  from	  the	  strength	  
of	  our	  intuition	  that	  we	  are	  indeed	  free-­‐willed.	  	  
	  
Let	  us	  now	  consider	  his	  second,	  positive,	  argument.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  
being	  a	  libertarian,	  van	  Inwagen	  endorses	  the	  minor	  premise	  of	  the	  
libertarian	  argument.	  Thus,	  he	  needs	  a	  non-­‐intuitionist	  justification	  for	  
this	  endorsement.	  Indeed,	  he	  claims	  not	  only	  that	  libertarians	  need	  an	  
argument	  for	  this	  but	  also	  that	  he	  has	  found	  a	  good	  one.	  This	  argument	  
consists	  of	  another	  Modus	  Tollens	  inference.	  Its	  major	  premise	  is	  the	  
conditional	  proposition	  that	  if	  we	  do	  not	  have	  free	  will	  then	  we	  are	  not	  
morally	  responsible;	  the	  minor	  premise	  is	  the	  proposition	  that	  we	  are,	  in	  
fact,	  morally	  responsible;	  and	  the	  conclusion	  is,	  obviously,	  the	  proposition	  
that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  we	  do	  not	  have	  free	  will.	  So,	  we	  have	  it.	  	  
	  
Now,	  the	  idea	  that	  having	  free	  will,	  in	  some	  sense	  of	  this	  term,	  is	  a	  
necessary	  condition	  for	  our	  having	  moral	  responsibility,	  in	  some	  sense	  of	  
this	  other	  term,	  seems	  pretty	  straightforward.	  The	  problem	  for	  libertarian	  
philosophers	  is,	  of	  course,	  proving	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  free	  will	  which	  is	  
necessary	  for	  ascriptions	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  to	  make	  sense	  needs	  to	  
be	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  the	  particularly	  strong	  reading	  of	  
the	  PAP	  and	  of	  the	  PUR	  they	  endorse.	  But	  let	  us	  put	  this	  problem	  aside	  for	  
the	  moment	  and	  concentrate	  on	  the	  issue	  that	  is	  here	  of	  crucial	  
importance,	  namely,	  the	  following.	  How	  does	  van	  Inwagen	  justify	  his	  
claim	  to	  know	  that	  we	  do	  enjoy	  of	  moral	  responsibility?	  Well,	  his	  answer	  
to	  this	  question	  is	  basically	  the	  following:	  our	  life	  in	  common	  is	  such	  that	  
we	  “cannot	  but	  view	  our	  belief	  in	  moral	  responsibility	  as	  a	  justified	  belief,	  
a	  belief	  that	  is	  simply	  not	  open	  to	  reasonable	  doubt.”	  	  	  	  
	  
Within	  the	  general	  economy	  of	  van	  Inwagen’s	  inferential	  construction,	  
this	  is	  a	  startling	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  above,	  to	  say	  the	  least!	  As	  a	  
matter	  of	  fact,	  I	  suppose	  no	  one	  fails	  to	  recognize	  in	  van	  Inwagen’s	  
previously	  described	  anti-­‐intuitionist	  argument	  a	  rather	  familiar	  form.	  It	  
is	  the	  form	  characterizing	  one	  of	  the	  most	  famous	  philosophical	  
arguments	  ever,	  namely,	  Descartes’	  argument	  of	  the	  malin	  génie.	  In	  
reality,	  the	  latter	  is,	  in	  turn,	  just	  a	  rewording	  of	  an	  even	  older	  argument,	  
namely,	  the	  skeptic	  argument	  against	  the	  admissibility	  of	  inferring	  the	  
reality	  of	  the	  outside	  world	  from	  the	  data	  of	  our	  experience.	  Now,	  this	  is	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not	  the	  place	  to	  judge	  the	  merits	  or	  demerits	  of	  epistemic	  skepticism.	  But	  
if	  an	  argument	  like	  van	  Inwagen’s	  anti-­‐intuitionist	  argument,	  modelled	  on	  
the	  classical	  argument	  of	  epistemic	  skepticism,	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  good	  
argument	  against	  the	  admissibility	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  we	  enjoy	  of	  free	  will	  
because	  we	  have	  the	  intuition	  that	  we	  do,	  then	  how	  can	  the	  claim	  that	  we	  
have	  free	  will	  because	  we	  have	  moral	  responsibility,	  and	  that	  we	  have	  
moral	  responsibility	  because	  our	  belief	  that	  we	  do	  is	  beyond	  any	  
reasonable	  doubt,	  be	  any	  better?	  	  
	  
Let	  me	  press	  this	  point	  a	  bit	  further.	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  obvious	  that,	  
whatever	  else	  belongs	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  moral	  responsibility,	  it	  only	  
makes	  sense	  to	  claim	  that	  such	  a	  concept	  applies	  truly	  to	  us	  if	  we	  conceive	  
of	  ourselves	  as	  being	  part	  of	  a	  world	  populated	  by	  communities	  of	  agents	  
living	  in	  close	  interaction	  with	  each	  other.	  However,	  we	  can	  only	  claim	  to	  
know	  we	  live	  in	  such	  a	  world	  if	  we	  have	  somehow	  managed	  to	  get	  over	  
the	  skeptical	  arguments	  against	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  outside	  world	  and	  
other	  minds.	  Thus,	  if	  the	  reason	  why	  we	  cannot	  rely	  on	  the	  truthfulness	  of	  
our	  intuition	  that	  we	  have	  free	  will	  is	  that	  we	  don’t	  know	  how	  to	  
overcome	  skeptic	  arguments	  against	  the	  external	  existence	  of	  the	  objects	  
of	  our	  cognition,	  the	  very	  same	  reason	  should	  prevent	  us	  from	  the	  outset	  
from	  accepting	  the	  inference	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  from	  
our	  belief	  in	  it	  as	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  we	  have	  free	  will.	  	  
	  
Van	  Inwagen	  is	  thus	  being	  incoherent	  here.	  Indeed,	  I	  believe	  that,	  if	  he	  
wants	  us	  to	  take	  seriously	  his	  argument	  against	  free	  will-­‐intuitionism,	  
then	  he	  cannot	  possibly	  want	  us	  to	  take	  seriously	  his	  foundational	  
argument	  appealing	  to	  moral	  responsibility.	  Alternatively,	  if	  he	  wants	  us	  
to	  take	  seriously	  his	  foundational	  argument	  appealing	  to	  moral	  
responsibility,	  then	  he	  cannot	  possibly	  want	  us	  to	  take	  seriously	  his	  
argument	  against	  free	  will-­‐intuitionism.	  
	  
Now,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  skeptic	  arguments	  of	  the	  same	  form	  of	  those	  
concerning	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  outside	  world	  and	  other	  minds	  are	  
particularly	  relevant	  in	  a	  debate	  about	  the	  reality	  or	  unreality	  of	  free	  will.	  
Or,	  at	  least,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  they	  are	  any	  more	  relevant	  here	  than	  they	  in	  
general	  are	  for	  the	  assessment	  of	  any	  contention	  whatsoever	  concerning	  
the	  scope	  and	  validity	  of	  our	  knowledge	  claims.	  So,	  let	  me	  ignore	  them	  
here.	  	  
	  
This	  said,	  don’t	  misunderstand	  me.	  In	  spite	  of	  having	  disregarded	  
epistemic	  skepticism,	  I	  do	  not	  consider	  that	  our	  alleged	  intuition	  
concerning	  our	  being	  endowed	  with	  free	  will	  is	  at	  all	  of	  the	  same	  
epistemic	  nature	  as	  are	  our	  intuitions	  that	  we	  are	  not	  brains	  in	  a	  vat,	  or	  
that	  our	  own	  bodies	  exist	  in	  an	  independent	  material	  world,	  or	  that	  the	  
two	  hands	  with	  which	  this	  paper	  is	  being	  typed	  are	  indeed	  my	  hands.	  
Specially,	  if	  the	  free	  will	  which	  happens	  to	  be	  the	  target	  of	  this	  intuition	  is	  
to	  be	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  strong	  reading	  of	  the	  two	  
also	  above-­‐mentioned	  principles,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  in	  libertarian	  thinking.	  
Thus,	  I	  do	  not	  disagree	  with	  van	  Inwagen’s	  claim	  that	  we	  do	  need	  an	  
	   5	  
argument	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  minor	  premise	  of	  the	  libertarian	  
argument,	  if	  we	  are	  to	  give	  it	  some	  credit.	  I	  simply	  disagree	  with	  him	  on	  
the	  appropriateness	  of	  the	  argument	  he	  puts	  forth	  in	  order	  to	  claim	  that	  
we	  do	  need	  such	  an	  argument.	  	  
	  
So	  let	  me	  choose	  the	  second	  prong	  of	  the	  alternative	  mentioned	  above,	  
and	  let	  me	  take	  seriously	  van	  Inwagen’s	  argument	  according	  to	  which	  it	  is	  
true	  that	  we	  have	  free	  will	  because	  our	  having	  it	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  
for	  our	  having	  moral	  responsibility	  and	  our	  belief	  that	  we	  have	  the	  latter	  
is	  beyond	  any	  reasonable	  doubt;	  as	  a	  consequence,	  let	  me	  disregard	  van	  
Inwagen’s	  ‘anti-­‐intuitionist’	  argument.	  	  
	  
	  
3.	  ‘Legislating	  for	  the	  universe	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  present	  
desires	  of	  men’	  
	  
Now,	  I	  think	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  counter-­‐argument	  to	  the	  use	  of	  our	  having	  
moral	  responsibility	  as	  a	  minor	  premise	  in	  an	  argument	  such	  as	  van	  
Inwagen’s.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  van	  Inwagen	  himself	  considers	  this	  
counter-­‐argument,	  even	  if	  only	  to	  dismiss	  it.	  It	  is	  the	  following.	  If	  we	  were	  
to	  accept	  van	  Inwagen’s	  argument	  as	  a	  good	  argument,	  then	  we	  would	  be	  
inferring	  substantial	  conclusions	  about	  how	  the	  physical	  world	  is	  
supposed	  to	  be,	  namely,	  that	  determinism	  is	  false	  about	  nature	  in	  general,	  
from	  premises	  having	  to	  do	  with	  moral	  notions,	  namely,	  the	  notion	  that	  
we	  enjoy	  of	  moral	  responsibility.	  But	  the	  way	  the	  physical	  world	  is	  is	  
surely	  totally	  independent	  from	  any	  details	  concerning	  the	  existence	  or	  
inexistence	  of	  moral	  constraints	  on	  our	  actions.	  After	  all,	  the	  issue	  
whether	  determinism	  is	  true	  or	  not	  would	  make	  sense	  even	  if	  the	  human	  
race	  had	  never	  populated	  the	  earth	  and	  no	  moral	  notions	  ever	  came	  to	  
exist.	  	  	  	  
	  
This	  very	  same	  point	  was	  forcefully	  made	  by	  Bertrand	  Russell	  one	  
century	  ago.	  He	  wrote,	  having	  Spencerian	  evolutionists	  in	  mind,	  that	  “to	  
regard	  ethical	  notions	  as	  a	  key	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  is	  
essentially	  pre-­‐Copernican”.	  And	  to	  this	  he	  added:	  “human	  ethical	  notions	  
(...)	  are	  essentially	  anthropocentric,	  and	  involve,	  when	  used	  in	  
metaphysics,	  an	  attempt,	  however	  veiled,	  to	  legislate	  for	  the	  universe	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  the	  present	  desires	  of	  men.”	  (Russell	  1914,	  p.	  83)	  Although	  
written	  within	  a	  different	  context,	  these	  words	  may	  be	  taken	  to	  conclude	  
appropriately	  what	  is	  essentially	  an	  argument	  carrying	  a	  considerable	  
amount	  of	  inductive	  force.	  
	  
Awkwardly,	  van	  Inwagen	  claims	  that	  an	  incompatibilist	  should	  answer	  
such	  a	  counter-­‐argument	  by	  saying	  that	  it	  carries	  no	  more	  force	  against	  
his	  own	  argument	  than	  does	  a	  ’Universal	  deceiver’	  argument	  for	  
skepticism.	  Thus,	  an	  incompatibilist	  “ought	  not	  be	  more	  troubled	  by	  this	  
charge”	  than	  he	  is	  troubled	  by	  the	  latter	  sort	  of	  argument.	  Van	  Inwagen’s	  
is	  thus	  a	  strange	  sort	  of	  dialectic.	  In	  the	  course	  of	  one	  and	  the	  same	  
general	  argument,	  he	  manages	  to	  produce,	  first,	  a	  sub-­‐argument	  of	  the	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‘Universal	  deceiver’	  kind	  in	  order	  to	  prove	  that	  one	  cannot	  simply	  rest	  the	  
claim	  that	  we	  do	  have	  free	  will	  on	  the	  intuition	  that	  we	  do	  have	  it,	  and,	  
secondly,	  a	  swift	  dismissal	  of	  an	  inductively	  relevant	  argument	  against	  his	  
own	  proposal	  of	  supporting	  the	  free	  will	  claim	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  our	  
intuition	  that	  we	  are	  morally	  responsible	  by	  claiming	  that	  such	  a	  counter-­‐
argument	  has	  no	  more	  force	  against	  his	  proposal	  than	  has	  a	  skeptic	  
argument	  of	  the	  ‘Universal	  deceiver’	  kind.	  This	  is	  rather	  baffling;	  I	  simply	  
do	  not	  know	  how	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  peculiar	  conjunction	  of	  
arguments.	  So	  let	  me	  move	  away	  from	  van	  Inwagen’s	  version	  of	  
libertarian	  anti-­‐intuitionism	  and	  let	  me	  search	  for	  another	  non	  
intuitionist	  way	  of	  justifying	  the	  minor	  premise	  of	  the	  libertarian	  
argument.	  	  	  
	  
	  
4.	  Free	  Will	  as	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  Rationality.	  
	  
In	  a	  recent	  book,	  suggestively	  titled	  Rationality	  +	  Consciousness	  =	  Free	  
Will,	  David	  Hodgson	  claims	  that	  the	  alleged	  truth	  of	  the	  minor	  premise	  of	  
the	  libertarian	  argument	  admits	  being	  derived	  from	  our	  being	  rational	  
conscious	  beings.	  Obviously,	  neither	  the	  concept	  of	  rationality	  nor	  the	  
concepts	  of	  consciousness	  or	  free	  will	  belong	  to	  the	  sort	  of	  entities	  of	  
which	  it	  could	  make	  sense	  to	  conceive	  of	  them	  as	  being	  either	  the	  
arguments	  or	  the	  values	  of	  an	  arithmetical	  function	  like	  addition.	  In	  
reality,	  what	  Hodgson’s	  view	  may	  be	  taken	  to	  illustrate	  is	  a	  standpoint	  
according	  to	  which	  the	  having	  of	  free	  will	  is,	  among	  other	  things,	  a	  
necessary	  condition	  for	  truthful	  ascriptions	  of	  rationality	  and	  
consciousness.	  	  
	  
Now,	  let	  us	  suppose	  this	  contention	  is	  accepted.	  Under	  such	  
circumstances,	  the	  contrapositive	  of	  the	  statement	  expressing	  it	  can	  be	  
taken	  to	  perform	  the	  role	  of	  the	  major	  premise	  in	  a	  Modus	  Tollens	  
inference,	  the	  minor	  premise	  of	  which	  would	  be	  the	  proposition	  that	  we	  
are,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  conscious	  rational	  beings;	  the	  conclusion	  of	  this	  
inference	  would	  obviously	  be	  the	  proposition	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  
we	  do	  not	  have	  free	  will.	  This	  would	  be	  formally	  similar	  to	  van	  Inwagen’s	  
above	  described	  argument,	  but	  the	  concepts	  of	  rationality	  and	  
consciousness	  would	  replace	  in	  this	  alternative	  argument	  the	  role	  the	  
concept	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  played	  in	  the	  original	  one.	  Let	  me	  then	  
take	  a	  look	  at	  this	  alternative	  both	  to	  libertarian	  intuitionism	  and	  to	  van	  
Inwagen’s	  anti-­‐intuitionist	  approach.	  	  
	  
I	  do	  not	  doubt	  that	  we	  are	  conscious.	  I	  take	  it	  this	  goes	  without	  saying.	  
Whether	  or	  not	  having	  consciousness	  might	  be	  necessary	  for	  having	  free	  
will	  is,	  however,	  another	  matter.	  But	  it	  is	  the	  other	  term	  of	  the	  left	  hand	  
side	  of	  Hodgson’s	  equation	  I	  want	  to	  focus	  on.	  Namely,	  I	  want	  to	  discuss	  
whether	  it	  is	  really	  the	  case	  that	  rationality	  might	  play	  the	  role	  Hodgson	  
ascribes	  to	  it,	  i.e.,	  that	  of	  being	  a	  necessary	  part	  of	  a	  sufficient	  condition	  
for	  free	  will.	  Indeed,	  most	  participants	  in	  the	  free	  will	  debate	  seem	  to	  
assume	  that	  no	  other	  mortal	  creatures	  besides	  us,	  the	  rational	  animals,	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are	  free-­‐willed;	  this	  points	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  presumably	  relevant	  link	  
connecting	  rationality	  and	  free	  will.	  A	  possible	  justification	  for	  the	  
existence	  of	  this	  link	  could	  be	  the	  following:	  free	  will	  emerges	  from	  a	  
specific	  kind	  of	  cognitive	  complexity,	  namely,	  the	  kind	  of	  cognitive	  
complexity	  that	  also	  subserves	  the	  emergence	  of	  rationality	  in	  us.	  	  
	  
Being	  a	  necessary	  part	  of	  a	  sufficient	  condition	  for	  free	  will,	  truthful	  
ascriptions	  of	  rationality	  could	  then	  play	  the	  demarcation	  role	  typically	  
played	  by	  an	  adequacy	  condition.	  They	  would	  then	  separate	  the	  
purposeful	  behaviour	  of	  cognitively	  sophisticated	  agents	  of	  whom	  free	  
will	  could	  be	  meaningfully	  ascribed	  from	  the	  purposeful	  behaviour	  of	  less	  
sophisticated	  creatures	  of	  whom	  free	  will	  could	  not	  be	  meaningfully	  
ascribed.	  	  
	  
But	  what	  it	  is	  that	  one	  ascribes,	  when	  one	  is	  truthfully	  ascribing	  
rationality	  to	  a	  creature?	  In	  his	  above-­‐mentioned	  book	  Hodgson	  never	  
defines	  this	  term.	  He	  concentrates	  his	  attention	  rather	  in	  what	  he	  
sometimes	  calls	  “instinctive	  informal	  rationality”,	  a	  concept	  the	  content	  of	  
which	  is	  actually	  far	  from	  clear.	  So,	  let	  me	  put	  aside	  Hodgson’s	  own	  sui	  
generis	  approach	  to	  this	  topic,	  and	  let	  me	  try	  to	  figure	  out	  how	  a	  more	  
traditionally	  defined	  concept	  of	  rationality	  would	  fare	  in	  the	  above-­‐
mentioned	  role.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
5. Aristotle,	  the	  Fable	  of	  the	  Bees	  and	  Folk-­‐Psychological	  Law	  
	  
According	  to	  philosophical	  tradition,	  rationality	  is	  what	  is	  possessed	  by	  a	  
rational	  agent;	  a	  rational	  agent	  is,	  in	  turn,	  a	  creature	  α	  that	  behaves	  
according	  to	  the	  following	  scheme	  (I+II)	  –	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘practical	  




α	  has	  a	  desire	  δ	  the	  content	  of	  which	  is	  γ;	  
α	  has	  a	  belief	  β	  the	  content	  of	  which	  is	  that	  doing	  θ	  is	  the	  best	  thing	  to	  do	  
to	  get	  γ;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________________________________________________________________	  




α	  believes	  that	  doing	  θ	  is	  the	  best	  thing	  for	  him	  to	  do.	  
α	  believes	  that	  no	  obstacle	  prevents	  him	  from	  doing	  θ.	  
___________________________________________	  
∴	  α	  does	  θ.	  
	  
Two	  millennia	  after	  Aristotle,	  this	  scheme	  kept	  providing	  the	  model	  for	  
the	  description	  of	  the	  behaviour	  of	  rational	  agents	  (typically,	  persons).	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This	  much	  may	  be	  attested	  by	  reading	  the	  following	  words	  Bernard	  de	  
Mandeville	  wrote	  in	  his	  most	  famous	  essay	  The	  Fable	  of	  the	  Bees:	  or	  
Private	  Vices,	  Publick	  Benefits:	  
	  	  
“no	  Person	  can	  commit	  or	  set	  about	  an	  Action,	  which	  at	  that	  then	  present	  




“When	  two	  Things	  are	  left	  to	  a	  Person’s	  Choice,	  it	  is	  a	  Demonstration,	  that	  
he	  thinks	  That	  most	  eligible	  which	  he	  chuses,	  how	  contradictory,	  
impertinent	  or	  pernicious	  soever	  his	  Reason	  for	  chusing	  it	  may	  be:	  
Without	  this	  there	  could	  be	  no	  voluntary	  suicide;	  and	  it	  would	  be	  Injustice	  
to	  punish	  Men	  for	  their	  crimes.”	  ”	  (vol.	  II,	  p.	  197).	  
	  
Later	  on,	  in	  the	  1970s,	  the	  philosopher	  Paul	  Churchland	  proposed	  the	  
following	  multiply	  quantified	  conditional	  sentence	  as	  a	  contemporary	  
update	  of	  traditional	  Aristotelian	  rationality:	  
	  
“(∀X)(∀Φ)(∀A){[1.(X	  wants	  Φ)&	  2.(X	  believes	  that	  A-­‐ing	  is	  a	  way	  for	  him	  
to	  bring	  about	  Φ	  under	  the	  existing	  circumstances)	  &	  3.(	  there	  is	  no	  
action	  believed	  by	  X	  to	  be	  a	  way	  for	  him	  to	  bring	  about	  Φ,	  under	  the	  
circumstances,	  which	  X	  judges	  to	  be	  as	  preferable	  to	  him	  as,	  or	  more	  
preferable	  to	  him	  than,	  A-­‐ing)	  &	  4.	  (X	  has	  no	  other	  want	  or	  wants	  which,	  
under	  the	  circumstances,	  overrides	  his	  want	  to	  Φ)	  &	  5.(X	  knows	  how	  to	  
A)	  &	  6.	  (X	  is	  able	  to	  A)]	  →	  (X	  A-­‐s)}”.	  
	  	  
More	  importantly,	  Churchland	  dubbed	  this	  sentence	  to	  be	  the	  nomic	  
kernel	  of	  what,	  in	  philosophical	  jargon,	  was	  to	  become	  known	  as	  ‘Folk-­‐
Psychology’,	  that	  is,	  the	  proto-­‐scientific	  theory	  we	  all	  use	  when	  trying	  to	  




6. Newell’s	  Cognitive	  Systems	  	  	  
	  
However,	  at	  least	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1950’s,	  the	  very	  same	  scheme	  of	  the	  
practical	  syllogism	  came	  also	  to	  be	  adopted	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  definition	  of	  a	  
different	  and	  unabashedly	  deterministic	  notion	  –	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  cognitive	  
system.	  Allen	  Newell,	  a	  distinguished	  researcher	  in	  AI,	  characterized	  this	  
notion	  in	  more	  or	  less	  the	  following	  terms.	  A	  cognitive	  system	  is	  a	  
physical	  system	  the	  behaviour	  of	  which	  obeys	  the	  following	  general	  law:	  
if	  the	  system	  has	  a	  particular	  goal	  O	  and	  if	  it	  harbours	  the	  knowledge	  
items	  C1,...,Cn,	  according	  to	  which	  performing	  action	  A	  is	  conducive	  to	  the	  
bringing	  about	  of	  goal	  O,	  then	  the	  system	  does	  action	  	  A.	  
	  
When	  introducing	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  cognitive	  system,	  Newell	  was	  talking	  
about	  all	  kinds	  of	  purposeful	  physical	  systems	  including,	  among	  others,	  
animals,	  even	  very	  primitive	  ones,	  and	  robots	  and	  other	  complex	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machines.	  No	  assumption	  of	  free	  will	  is	  made	  in	  his	  definition	  above,	  and	  
none	  should	  be.	  	  
	  
Obviously,	  accepting	  that	  Newell’s	  notion	  is	  well	  motivated	  is	  tantamount	  
to	  accept	  that	  rationality,	  thus	  understood,	  is	  perfectly	  independent	  from	  
free	  will.	  Thus,	  after	  Newell	  and	  AI,	  if	  rationality	  were	  to	  remain	  being	  
understood	  in	  the	  Aristotelian	  way,	  its	  use	  as	  an	  adequacy	  condition	  for	  
ascriptions	  of	  free	  will	  would	  be	  bogus.	  
	  
	  
7. What	  makes	  best	  best?	  
	  
But	  the	  definition	  of	  what	  is	  a	  rational	  agent	  did	  change	  in	  interesting	  
respects.	  	  
	  
As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  more	  or	  less	  at	  the	  same	  time	  AI	  was	  giving	  its	  first	  
steps,	  the	  Aristotelian	  definition	  of	  rationality	  was	  taken	  by	  many	  people	  
in	  the	  field	  to	  be	  too	  coarse	  to	  adequately	  define	  the	  behaviour	  of	  a	  
rational	  agent.	  In	  particular,	  people	  felt	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  an	  agent	  taking	  
a	  particular	  course	  of	  action	  to	  be	  the	  best,	  given	  his	  desires	  and	  his	  
beliefs	  about	  the	  world,	  was	  still	  in	  need	  of	  clarification.	  	  
	  
Underlying	  this	  need	  was	  the	  realization	  that,	  given	  the	  same	  set	  of	  
desires	  and	  beliefs	  about	  the	  world,	  different	  courses	  of	  action	  were	  
always	  available	  to	  the	  agent;	  however,	  assuming	  that	  ‘best’	  did	  not	  mean	  
simply	  ‘what	  happened	  to	  be	  chosen’,	  there	  had	  to	  be	  some	  objectively	  
identifiable	  criterion	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  which	  one	  of	  the	  
available	  options	  admitted	  being	  selected	  as	  subjectively	  better	  than	  the	  
others.	  
	  
The	  criterion	  of	  optimality	  that	  ended	  up	  being	  proposed	  was	  the	  so-­‐
called	  principle	  of	  'maximization	  of	  expected	  utility'.	  Adopting	  this	  
principle	  as	  a	  criterion	  of	  rationality	  meant	  that	  the	  choice	  behaviour	  of	  a	  
rational	  agent	  could	  be	  appropriately	  modelled	  by	  the	  following	  set	  of	  
procedures:	  
	  
1.	  the	  agent’s	  beliefs	  about	  the	  obtaining	  of	  each	  of	  the	  relevant	  possible	  
states	  of	  the	  world	  were	  to	  be	  measured	  by	  a	  probability	  function;	  
2.	  the	  numerical	  values	  thus	  obtained	  were	  to	  be	  multiplied	  by	  the	  
numerical	  values	  measuring	  the	  comparative	  utility	  or	  desirability	  of	  each	  
of	  the	  possible	  outcomes	  of	  the	  action	  under	  consideration;	  	  
3.	  the	  products	  so	  obtained	  were	  to	  be	  added;	  	  
4.	  the	  sum	  thus	  obtained	  would	  exhibit	  a	  value	  –	  called	  the	  ‘expected	  
utility’	  of	  undertaking	  a	  given	  course	  of	  action	  –	  that	  would	  allow	  the	  
agent	  to	  numerically	  compare	  it	  with	  the	  values	  of	  the	  other	  courses	  of	  
action	  available	  to	  him;	  	  
5.	  a	  decision	  to	  act	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  were	  to	  be	  reached	  by	  selecting	  the	  
course	  of	  action	  enjoying	  of	  the	  highest	  expected	  utility.	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The	  adoption	  of	  this	  criterion	  to	  be	  the	  mark	  of	  rationality	  is	  not	  
arbitrary.	  It	  is	  based	  upon	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  principles	  underlying	  what	  
admits	  being	  called	  ‘rational	  betting	  behaviour’.	  This	  is	  the	  behaviour	  
someone	  involved	  in	  a	  betting	  game	  has	  to	  follow	  in	  order	  not	  to	  suffer	  a	  
guaranteed	  loss	  at	  the	  game.	  	  
	  
Thus,	  the	  claim	  that	  rational	  agency	  is	  action	  in	  order	  to	  maximize	  
expected	  utility	  is	  a	  claim	  that	  can	  be	  mathematically	  proven	  once	  one	  
accepts	  the	  principle	  that	  the	  general	  behaviour	  of	  a	  rational	  agent	  is	  to	  be	  
modelled	  upon	  the	  behaviour	  of	  a	  rational	  better	  in	  a	  betting	  game.	  In	  
fact,	  this	  claim	  is	  a	  theorem	  that	  follows	  from	  the	  axioms	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  
the	  latter	  behaviour	  admits	  being	  formalized.	  
	  
	  
8. Pigeons	  do	  reasonably	  well	  in	  conforming	  to	  the	  axioms	  of	  
rational-­‐choice	  theory	  	  
	  
Having	  gone	  through	  this	  clarification	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  truthfully	  
ascribe	  rationality	  to	  an	  agent	  we	  are	  now	  in	  a	  position	  to	  ask	  the	  
following	  question:	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  modeling	  our	  purposeful	  
behaviour	  as	  the	  behaviour	  of	  rational	  betting	  agents	  the	  watermark	  that	  
identifies	  the	  kind	  of	  peculiar	  cognitive	  complexity	  we	  are	  endowed	  with?	  
	  
In	  particular,	  is	  it	  what	  identifies	  the	  kind	  of	  cognitive	  complexity	  that	  
might	  also	  be	  responsible	  for	  our	  being	  somehow	  endowed	  with	  free	  will?	  
Let	  us	  examine	  this.	  	  
	  
The	  title	  of	  this	  section	  refers	  to	  a	  paper	  by	  C.	  J.	  Kagel	  published	  about	  
twenty-­‐five	  years	  ago.	  It	  expresses	  fairly	  clearly	  the	  general	  idea	  of	  an	  
interesting	  new	  area	  of	  research.	  Since	  then,	  a	  whole	  body	  of	  literature	  
has	  grown	  devoted	  to	  the	  theme	  of	  successfully	  showing	  not	  only	  that	  
animal	  behaviour	  in	  general	  admits	  being	  interpreted	  as	  satisfying	  the	  
axioms	  of	  rationality,	  but	  that	  it	  fares	  better	  than	  human	  behaviour	  in	  that	  
respect	  (other	  suggestive	  titles	  in	  this	  literature	  are	  “Are	  humans	  less	  
rational	  than	  lower	  animals?”	  or	  “Rational	  animals?”	  or	  “Rationality	  in	  
risk-­‐sensitive	  foraging	  choices	  by	  starlings”).	  
	  
Simultaneously,	  an	  enormous	  amount	  of	  literature	  has	  been	  published	  
claiming	  that	  human	  behaviour	  does	  poorly	  in	  the	  business	  of	  being	  
rational,	  i.e.,	  that	  humans	  often	  and	  unmistakably	  violate	  the	  axioms	  of	  
rationality	  (by,	  inter	  alia,	  Tversky,	  Kahneman,	  Lichtenstein,	  Slovic,	  etc.)	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  There	  is	  something	  startling	  about	  this.	  How	  can	  the	  literature	  above	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  made	  to	  cohere	  with	  the	  work	  undertaken	  by	  rationality	  theorists,	  and	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  theoretical	  expectations	  contained	  in	  it?	  	  
	  
Let’s	  begin	  answering	  this	  question	  by	  taking	  a	  look	  at	  	  the	  axioms	  of	  
rationality	  theory.	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9. Axiom	  of	  Independence	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  main	  axioms	  of	  rationality	  theory	  is	  the	  axiom	  of	  
independence.	  It	  establishes	  the	  following:	  if	  x	  is	  chosen	  from	  the	  choice	  
set	  x	  and	  y,	  then	  y	  cannot	  be	  chosen	  when	  the	  choice	  set	  is	  widened	  to	  x,y,	  
and	  z.	  
	  
To	  try	  to	  figure	  out	  whether	  or	  not	  independence	  should	  be	  an	  axiom	  of	  
rationality	  imagine	  what	  would	  happen	  if	  independence	  were	  violated.	  
The	  following	  story	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  this.	  	  
	  
Imagine	  that	  you	  were	  invited	  for	  dinner	  at	  your	  friend’s	  home.	  As	  a	  
display	  of	  courtesy	  towards	  you,	  your	  friend	  invites	  you	  to	  choose	  the	  
wine.	  ‘I’ve	  a	  bottle	  of	  red	  (x)	  and	  a	  bottle	  of	  white	  (y)	  ;	  which	  one	  do	  you	  
prefer?’	  he	  asks	  you.	  You	  say	  you	  prefer	  the	  red	  (x).	  He	  then	  says:	  ‘Oh,	  I	  
forgot.	  I	  also	  have	  a	  bottle	  of	  rosé	  (z).’	  You	  then	  reply:	  ‘Oh,	  OK;	  in	  that	  case	  
I	  prefer	  the	  white	  (y)’.	  	  
	  
Your	  behaviour	  does	  seem	  weird.	  Your	  friend	  will	  probably	  think	  you’re	  
teasing	  him	  and	  won’t	  take	  you	  seriously.	  Thus,	  taking	  this	  example	  as	  a	  
standard	  of	  what	  would	  have	  to	  happen	  if	  people	  would	  go	  about	  
violating	  the	  axiom	  of	  independence	  does	  seem	  to	  indicate	  that,	  under	  
those	  circumstances,	  human	  life	  would	  become	  unrecognizably	  alien.	  	  
	  
Thus,	  assuming	  independence	  seems	  to	  make	  sense.	  But	  does	  it?	  
	  
Consider	  now	  another	  story.	  Keep	  imagining	  that	  you	  were	  invited	  for	  
dinner	  at	  your	  friend’s	  place.	  Imagine	  that,	  after	  the	  main	  course	  is	  over,	  
your	  friend	  realizes	  that	  he	  forgot	  to	  buy	  desert.	  He	  has	  a	  single	  portion	  of	  
apple	  pie	  in	  the	  fridge	  though;	  he	  knows	  you	  like	  apple	  pie	  and	  asks	  you	  if	  
you	  want	  to	  have	  it.	  You	  know	  that	  he	  also	  likes	  apple	  pie.	  So,	  you	  decline,	  
thus	  choosing	  nothing	  (x)	  over	  apple	  pie	  (y).	  	  
	  
A	  few	  moments	  later,	  another	  friend	  joins	  you	  for	  coffee;	  he	  brings	  with	  
him	  a	  set	  of	  chocolates	  from	  the	  deli	  around	  the	  corner.	  Offered	  to	  have	  
some	  chocolate	  (z),	  you	  decline	  the	  offer	  and	  choose	  the	  apple	  pie	  (y)	  
instead.	  	  
	  
Seemingly,	  you	  did	  here	  just	  the	  same	  thing	  you	  did	  in	  the	  previous	  
example	  –	  you	  violated	  the	  axiom	  of	  independence:	  you	  chose	  x	  	  from	  the	  
choice	  set	  x	  and	  y,	  and	  then	  you	  chose	  y,	  when	  the	  choice	  set	  was	  widened	  
to	  x,y,	  and	  z.	  	  
	  
However,	  your	  behaviour	  does	  not	  appear	  weird	  anymore;	  not	  only	  will	  
your	  friend	  not	  think	  you	  are	  teasing	  him	  but	  he	  will	  be	  moved	  by	  your	  
attitude	  and	  take	  it	  as	  a	  token	  of	  your	  friendship.	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10. Axiom	  of	  Cancellation	  and	  (un)sure	  things	  
	  
Let’s	  now	  consider	  another	  axiom:	  Cancellation	  or	  Substitutability.	  
Basically,	  it	  states	  the	  following:	  if	  an	  option	  A	  is	  at	  least	  as	  preferred	  as	  
an	  option	  B,	  then,	  if	  options	  C	  and	  D	  result	  from,	  respectively,	  options	  A	  
and	  B	  by	  a	  common	  change	  in	  their	  outcomes,	  then	  option	  C	  is	  at	  least	  as	  
preferred	  as	  option	  D.	  (i.e.,	  states	  with	  the	  same	  outcomes	  should	  cancel	  
out).	  
	  
Again,	  that	  states	  with	  the	  same	  outcomes	  should	  cancel	  out	  in	  a	  choice	  
process	  seems	  to	  make	  obvious	  sense.	  Why	  should	  they	  make	  a	  difference	  
at	  all?	  	  
	  
But	  is	  this	  really	  true?	  Let’s	  consider	  a	  particular	  decision	  problem,	  
devised	  precisely	  to	  test	  this	  axiom.	  This	  is	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘Allais	  Problem’.	  
It	  is	  the	  following:	  
	  
1.	  Make	  a	  choice	  between	  the	  following	  two	  options:	  Option	  A:	  a	  gamble	  
in	  which	  you	  win	  $1,000,000	  no	  matter	  what.	  Option	  B:	  a	  gamble	  in	  which	  
you	  have	  a	  0.89	  probability	  of	  winning	  $1,000,000,	  a	  0.10	  probability	  of	  
winning	  $5,000,000	  and	  a	  0.01	  probability	  of	  winning	  nothing.	  	  
	  
2.	  Make	  a	  choice	  between	  the	  following	  two	  options:	  Option	  C:	  a	  gamble	  in	  
which	  you	  have	  a	  0.11	  probability	  of	  winning	  $1,000,000	  and	  a	  0.89	  
probability	  of	  winning	  nothing.	  Option	  D:	  a	  gamble	  in	  which	  you	  have	  a	  
0.10	  probability	  of	  winning	  $5,000,000	  and	  a	  0.90	  probability	  of	  winning	  
nothing.	  	  
	  
How	  did	  you	  choose?	  
	  
Like	  most	  people,	  you	  probably	  chose	  option	  A	  over	  option	  B	  and	  option	  
D	  over	  option	  C.	  But	  options	  C	  and	  D	  result	  from	  options	  A	  and	  B	  by	  a	  
common	  change	  in	  their	  outcomes.	  That	  is,	  if	  you	  did	  choose	  that	  way,	  
your	  choice	  behaviour	  admits	  being	  represented	  thus:	  	  
	  
Problem	  1:	  0.11U(1,000,000)>0.10U(5,000,000)	  and	  
Problem	  2:	  0.10U(5,000,000)>0.11U(1,000,000).	  	  
	  
Choosing	  this	  way	  is,	  however,	  choosing	  in	  a	  contradictory	  way.	  
	  
According	  to	  the	  axiom	  of	  cancellation,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  rational,	  if	  you	  
preferred	  option	  A	  over	  option	  B	  in	  the	  first	  choice	  you	  had	  to	  have	  
preferred	  option	  C	  over	  option	  D	  in	  the	  second	  choice.	  	  
	  
	  
11. Going	  beyond	  immediate	  or	  ‘objective’	  utilities	  
	  
In	  both	  cases,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  reintroduce	  consistency	  by	  reinterpreting	  
differently	  the	  choice	  problems	  faced	  by	  the	  agents.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  that,	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one	  could	  (should)	  argue	  that	  the	  situations	  devised	  above	  need	  to	  be	  
contextualised	  beyond	  the	  immediate	  or	  ‘objective’	  utilities	  presented.	  
	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  independence,	  you	  could	  (should)	  say	  that,	  in	  your	  first	  
choice,	  you	  were	  not	  simply	  preferring	  nothing	  to	  apple	  pie;	  you	  were	  
preferring	  nothing	  (and	  being	  polite)	  to	  grabbing	  the	  only	  piece	  of	  dessert	  
your	  friend	  had	  left	  in	  the	  fridge	  (and	  being	  unpolite	  and	  let	  everybody	  
else	  hate	  you).	  
	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  cancellation,	  you	  could	  (should)	  say	  that	  by	  being	  
simultaneously	  risk-­‐averse	  when	  a	  gain	  is	  the	  dominant	  outcome	  and	  
risk-­‐prone	  when	  a	  loss	  is	  the	  dominant	  outcome,	  you	  were	  actually	  
maximizing	  avoidance	  of	  regret.	  Given	  that	  regret	  is	  a	  fact	  of	  human	  
psychological	  life	  with	  unpleasant	  experiential	  consequences,	  it	  would	  
make	  sense	  to	  go	  beyond	  the	  immediate	  utilities	  presented	  and	  
incorporate	  the	  expectation	  of	  regret	  into	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  utility	  of	  
the	  outcomes.	  	  
	  
Is	  there	  a	  problem	  with	  the	  following	  of	  this	  strategy	  in	  order	  to	  
reintroduce	  consistency?	  	  
	  
Well,	  there	  is,	  actually.	  As	  Stanovich	  emphasized,	  the	  axioms	  require	  that	  
you	  should	  abstract	  away	  from	  most	  aspects	  of	  the	  contextual	  
environment	  of	  the	  choice-­‐problems	  you	  face;	  but	  ordinary	  human	  life	  
cannot	  avoid	  social	  contextualizing.	  
	  
This	  tension,	  however,	  is	  absent	  when	  nonhuman	  animal	  behaviour	  is	  
modelled	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  axioms	  of	  rational	  choice.	  Typically,	  nonhuman	  
animals	  are	  responsive	  to	  immediate	  ‘objective’	  utilities	  alone,	  
independently	  of	  context.	  
	  
In	  consequence,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  echo	  here	  the	  following	  suggestion	  put	  
forward	  by	  Stanovich	  The	  empirical	  results	  reported	  in	  the	  literature	  
mentioned	  above	  can	  be	  made	  to	  cohere	  with	  the	  prescriptions	  of	  
rationality	  theory	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  beyond	  a	  fairly	  elementary	  level	  
of	  complexity,	  the	  more	  complex	  the	  cognitive	  architecture	  of	  an	  
organism	  is,	  the	  more	  difficult	  it	  is	  for	  it	  to	  be	  rational.	  
	  
If	  this	  is	  indeed	  the	  case,	  then	  rationality	  can	  certainly	  not	  play	  the	  role	  of	  	  
an	  adequacy	  condition	  for	  free	  will	  if	  we	  are	  to	  have	  it	  and	  non	  human	  
animals	  are	  not	  to	  have	  it.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  peculiar	  sort	  
of	  cognitive	  complexity	  humans	  display	  puts	  them	  at	  a	  disadvantage	  when	  
trying	  to	  be	  rational.	  	  
	  
	  
12. A	  two-­‐way	  power	  indeed	  
	  
In	  short,	  neither	  knowledge	  from	  moral	  responsibility	  nor	  rationality	  will	  
successfully	  replace	  intuitionism	  about	  free	  will	  as	  a	  means	  of	  justifying	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the	  minor	  premise	  of	  the	  libertarian	  version	  of	  the	  incompatibilist	  
argument.	  Of	  course,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  other	  alternatives	  to	  it	  
cannot	  be	  imagined.	  But	  it	  is	  certainly	  not	  easy	  to	  foresee	  what	  could	  
possibly	  be	  the	  evidence	  supporting	  the	  claim	  that	  any	  such	  hypothetical	  
alternative	  could	  play	  this	  justificatory	  role.	  	  
	  
Let	  me	  now	  present,	  in	  closing,	  what	  I	  take	  to	  be	  a	  viable	  hypothesis	  for	  
making	  sense	  of	  the	  content	  of	  libertarian	  intuitions	  about	  our	  being	  
endowed	  of	  free	  will.	  Typically,	  libertarian	  intuitionists	  phrase	  their	  
description	  of	  this	  content	  by	  means	  of	  the	  expression	  that	  we	  enjoy	  of	  a	  
‘two-­‐way	  power’	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  things	  that	  we	  deliberate	  upon.	  I	  do	  
agree	  many	  of	  us	  have	  an	  intuition	  more	  or	  less	  corresponding	  to	  this	  
description.	  However,	  and	  in	  view	  of	  the	  previous	  sections,	  I	  think	  it	  
makes	  more	  sense	  to	  interpret	  the	  intuition	  that	  we	  enjoy	  of	  such	  a	  power	  
as	  being	  an	  intuition	  generated	  by	  our	  awareness	  of	  the	  essential	  
unstability	  of	  our	  choice	  experiences.	  The	  latter	  is	  in	  turn	  the	  result	  of	  the	  
difficulties	  our	  cognitive	  make-­‐up	  lays	  down	  to	  our	  attempts	  at	  being	  
rational	  under	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  information	  that	  we	  seek	  to	  bring	  to	  
bear	  on	  the	  decision	  processes	  we	  get	  involved	  into.	  Thus,	  rather	  than	  
being	  generated	  by	  our	  experience	  of,	  in	  fact,	  exercising	  a	  mysterious	  god-­‐
like	  metaphysical	  power,	  such	  an	  intuition	  would	  be,	  according	  to	  my	  
proposal,	  a	  reflection	  of	  our	  all	  too	  real	  and	  down	  to	  earth	  cognitive	  
limitations.	  	  
	  
Indeed,	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  are	  social	  contextualisers	  (and	  also	  second-­‐order	  
evaluators	  of	  our	  own	  first-­‐order	  mental	  life,	  as	  Frankfurt	  has	  rightly	  
stressed)	  makes	  the	  rational	  framing	  of	  any	  decision	  of	  ours	  a	  highly	  
precarious	  business.	  This	  is	  why,	  I	  think,	  we	  systematically	  feel	  that	  we	  
could	  have	  done	  otherwise	  under	  the	  very	  same	  circumstances	  (which	  is,	  
in	  fact,	  the	  phenomenological	  content	  associated	  both	  with	  the	  expression	  
stating	  that	  ‘we	  have	  a	  two-­‐way	  power	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  things	  that	  we	  
deliberate	  upon’	  and	  with	  the	  intuition	  that	  a	  strong	  reading	  of	  the	  
principle	  of	  alternative	  possibilities	  is	  satisfied	  in	  our	  choices).	  	  
	  
Of	  course,	  if	  I	  am	  right	  in	  this	  respect,	  the	  libertarian	  that	  backs	  on	  his	  
having	  such	  an	  intuition	  the	  minor	  premise	  of	  the	  argument	  defining	  his	  
version	  of	  incompatibilism	  is	  incurring	  in	  a	  semantic	  fallacy.	  As	  a	  matter	  
of	  fact,	  he	  is	  implicitly	  interpreting	  the	  minor	  premise	  so	  as	  to	  be	  
plausibly	  empirically	  true,	  and	  seems	  not	  to	  realize	  that,	  under	  the	  
circumstances	  under	  which	  it	  is	  plausibly	  empirically	  true,	  the	  reference	  
of	  the	  term	  ‘free	  will’	  in	  the	  minor	  premise	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  the	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